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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of Third Judicial District Court, the 
Honorable Judge Su Chon presiding, and a supplemental memorandum decision 
viJ awarding Defendants' costs, including mediation costs. The Utah Supreme Court 
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. Section 78A-3-102. The case was 
transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals and 
jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78A-4-
103(2)G). The final judgment is attached hereto as Appendix A and the 
supplemental Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as Appendix B. 
RULES, STATUTES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following relevant statutes and rules are set forth in full at Appendix 
D: 
(1) Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-l0a-702, 16-l0a-807, 16-l0a-808, 16-l0a-809 
and 16-l0a-1608 
(2) Utah Rule of Evidence 803 
(3) Utah Rule of Evidence 801 
(4) Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 14 
(5) Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This case involves a dispute over ownership of an Asian market, Southeast 
Supermarket ("the Company"), located in Salt Lake City. The Plaintiffs are 
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siblings Weiman Ha ("Wein:an"), Muoi Ha ("Muoi"), and Olivia Ha ("Olivia") 
(colle_ctively, "Plaintiffs"), who claimed to hold the majority of shares in the 
market and therefore are entitled to call a shareholders' meeting to take over the 
market's operations. The Defendants are Cuong Si Trang (''Cuong"), who is 
President of the market, and Sylvia Trang ("Sylvia"), Cuong' s daughter and 
Secretary of the market. The Company was also named as a Defendant. (Cuong 
and Sylvia are collectively referred to as the "Trangs", and the Trangs and the 
Company are collectively referred to as "Defendants"). Cuong is married to 
Plaintiffs' sister, Pamela Trang ("Pamela") so this is also a family dispute. 
After a seven-day jury trial, the trial court correctly found that Plaintiffs 
were not the majority shareholders of Southeast Supermarket. The trial court 
found the ownership to be as follows: of the 125,700 currently issued and 
outstanding shares, Cuong owns 65,000 (51.71 % ), Muoi owns 40,000 (31.82% ), 
Weiman owns 15,700 (12.49%), and Olivia owns 5,000 (3.97%). Lavinia Ha 
("Lavinia"), another Ha sibling, was found to have previously owned 20,000 
shares, but to have sold all her shares back to the Company in July 2013. 
Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions, the trial court's findings are amply 
supported by the evidence. As an initial matter, Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently 
marshal the evidence such that reversal of the trial court is warranted. There was 
sufficient evidence to support the trial court's factual findings regarding the 
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number and distribution of shares. The trial court's credibility determinations 
were not clearly erroneous. In addition, Plaintiffs' claims of inconsistent 
testimony by the Trangs are flawed and do not require reversal on appeal. 
Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court should be reversed because it 
incorrectly relied on hearsay evidence in its Findings of Fact. These arguments 
·~ are flawed for several reasons. First, Plaintiffs overlook that most of this 
evidence was properly admitted under an exception to the hearsay rule, namely, 
the business records exception. Second, in some instances, Plaintiffs did not 
object to the purported hearsay testimony, and thus they did not preserve their 
arguments for appeal. Finally, the evidence Plaintiffs assert was incorrectly 
admitted and relied on by the trial court was not in fact hearsay because it was 
not offered or considered for the truth of the matter asserted. 
Plaintiffs further contend that because Lavinia was not a party to the case, 
the trial court erred by allowing Defendants to offer evidence of her interests. 
Yet throughout this case, Defendants have asserted that Lavinia owned shares in 
the Company; notably, Plaintiffs never objected to this assertion and did not 
suggest she needed to be added as a party until halfway through trial. Contrary 
to Plaintiffs' assertions, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 14 is inapplicable to this 
case because there is no claim for liability that the Defendants could seek to pass 
on to Lavinia. 
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In addition, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by concluding that 
their demand for a shareholders' meeting did not meet the statutory 
requirements. Because the demand was signed by their attorney, rather than 
them as shareholders, contrary to the express requirements of Utah Code Ann. 
Section 16-l0a-702, the trial court did not err in reaching this conclusion. 
Alternatively, any error was harmless because the trial court in fact ordered a 
shareholders' meeting in its final judgment. 
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred by awarding the Trangs 
mediation costs in the amount of $1,072.50. In making the award, the trial court 
correctly noted that Plaintiffs never objected to the Trangs' request for mediation 
costs; therefore, this issue was not preserved for appeal. Alternatively, even if 
preserved, it was within the trial court's sound discretion to award these costs. 
The trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and 
Judgment attached hereto as Appendix A should be affirmed in its entirety. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In 1997, Cuong quit his job as a mechanical engineer and become the 
proprietor of an Asian food market known as "Tay Do." (R. 1538 at 123-124). 
2. Cuong acquired the market from Long Xa using his own personal 
funds and additional money that he borrowed from his uncle. (Id. at 124). 
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3. Cuong renamed the market "New Tay Do" and operated the market 
as a sole proprietorship. (Id. at 124-125). 
4. When the market was acquired in 1997, Weiman lived and worked 
in New York, Muoi lived in Canada, and Olivia lived in Canada. (R. 1537 at 38, 
77-78; R. 1538 at 12-13, 47, 127-130; R. 1540 at 50). 
5. Over the course of the next two years, Weiman and Muoi moved to 
Salt Lake City and went to work for the market.1 (R. 1538 at 127-129). 
6. During this period of time, Muoi and Olivia contributed some 
money to the operation of the market. (Id. at 133-134). 
7. Although Weiman claims to have contributed funds to the operation 
of the market, no evidence supported this claim other than his own self-serving 
testimony, and he could not articulate a specific date the money was provided or 
an amount that was given. (R. 1540 at 84-87; see also R. 1538 at 134-135 (Weiman 
contributed no money)). 
8. By 1999, Cuong decided to incorporate the market. (R. 1538 at 135). 
9. Cuong discussed the idea with Weiman, Muoi and Olivia and with 
his other sister-in-law, Lavinia. (Id. at 138). 
1 Olivia travelled to Utah and assisted in the market on occasion, but did not 
move back to Salt Lake City until 2001. (R. 1537 at 46; R. 1538 at 15, 19, 48, 130, 
132-133; R. 1540 at 50). 
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10. Weiman' s grown daughter, Ellen Ha Nicoletti ("Ellen"), an 
accountant then living in California, assisted in forming the corporate entity. 
Ellen assisted in the preparation of, among other things, Articles of Incorporation 
and Corporate Bylaws for the Company. Ellen also assisted Cuong in 
terminating the business name ,.,New Tay Do." (R. 1538 at 110-112, 137-139; R. 
1539 at 6-14).2 
11. The Con1pany was officially formed on March 24, 1999. (Ex. P2). 
12. The Articles of Incorporation for the Company, prepared by Ellen, 
identify both Cuong and Weiman as directors of the Company. (Id. at Art. VI). 
13. Both Cuong and Weiman were aware of their assigned role as 
Directors of the C01npany, and both agreed to serve in that capacity. (R. 1538 at 
139; R. 1540 at 54, 105). 
14. The Articles of Incorporation for the Company authorize the 
issuance of 145,700 shares of stock. (Ex. P2 at Art. III). 
15. On or before March 23, 1999, it was determined that shares in the 
Company would be issued as follows: Cuong: 65,000; Muoi: 40,000; Lavinia Ha 
("Lavinia"): 35,700; Olivia: 5,000. (R. 1539 at 34-36; Ex. DS). 
2 Although Weiman denied Ellen's involvement, dismissing her as a "girl", Muoi 
and Olivia testified that they did not know whether she was involved or not. (R. 
1537 at 87). 
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16. Cuong, Muoi, Lavinia and Olivia were the four originally identified 
shareholders for the Company. (R. 1539 at 34). 
17. Lavinia later determined, however, that she wanted some of her 
anticipated shares, 15,700, to be issued to her brother, Weiman, instead. It was 
therefore agreed that the shares of the Company would be issued as follows: 
Cuong Trang: 65,000; Muoi Ha: 40,000; Lavinia Ha: 20,000; Weiman Ha: 15,700; 
Olivia Ha: 5,000. (Id. at 35-37). 
18. Effective March 23, 1999, Lavinia, who lived and worked in 
California, executed a Revocable Proxy authorizing her brother, Weiman, to vote 
her shares in the Company in her absence. (Ex. D6). 
19. The Revocable Proxy document was prepared by Ellen using the 
Trangs' home computer. Lavinia, who lived in California, signed the document 
and mailed it to Cuong. (R. 1541 at 126-129). 
20. Weiman, Muoi and Olivia each worked as employees of the 
Company. (R. 1538 at 127, 129, 131). 
21. Weiman had general responsibility for the financial affairs of the 
Company, had access to and signature authority on the Company's bank 
accounts, and was responsible for the Company's tax filings, including sales and 
income tax filings. (R. 1537 at 44-45; R. 1538 at 128; R. 1539 at 51; R. 1540 at 56, 
82-83, 155). 
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22. Muoi and Olivia worked as sales clerks. Muoi also assisted in the 
ordering of inventory, and Olivia helped stock the shelves. (R. 1538 at 129, 131). 
23. Cuong worked long hours to ensure the Company's continued 
growth and success. (R. 1538 at 125-126). 
24. Cuong frequently called upon his children to help at the market and 
to ensure that all of the work could be done. (R. 1538 at 126-127; R. 1539 at 53, 
121-122). 
25. In 2004, it was discovered that ·weiman had been writing checks on 
the Company accounts in order to pay for rent for the separate restaurant, South 
China House, which he had opened next door, to pay for equipment and 
upgrades for the restaurant, and to pay for personal expenses, including medical 
expenses associated with a stroke. (R. 1539 at 40-42; R. 1540 at 133-153; R. 1541 at 
42-43). ~ 
26. As a result of this discovery, Cuong removed Weiman as Director 
and revoked his authority to write checks on the Company's accounts. (R. 1539 
at 41; R. 1541 at 42-43;; R. 1542 at 91-95; Ex. D8). 
27. Letters regarding Cuong' s removal as a Director were mailed to 
Weiman, Muoi, Olivia and Lavinia. (R. 1539 at44-47; Exs. D9 & D10). 
28. Cuong also discussed Weiman's removal as a Director with Lavinia. 
(R. 1539 at 48). 
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29. Around this same time, Lavinia signed a document revoking the 
proxy she had previously given to Weiman to vote her shares in the Company. 
(R. 1539 at 48-49; R. 1541 at 131-132; Ex. D11). 
30. The proxy revocation document was prepared by Sylvia using the 
Trangs' home computer and mailed to Lavinia in California. Cuong received a 
~ copy of the document, signed by Lavinia, in the mail. (R. 1539 at 48; R. 1541 at 
131-133). 
31. In 2007, it was determined that Muoi was taking money and/or 
inventory from the Company. As a result of this discovery, Muoi's employment 
with the company was terminated. (R. 1539 at 53-54; R. 1541 at 86; see also R. 1541 
at 86-101 & D31 (surveillance video clips and related testimony evidencing 
Muoi' s theft cash register)). 
32. On November 14, 2009, Sylvia officially became the Secretary and 
Treasurer of the Company but began to perform secretarial functions for the 
~ Company as early as 2008. Cuong continued to serve as the Company's 
President and CEO. (R. 1541 at 15-16; D24). 
33. On February 26, 2010, Weiman Ha sent a letter to the Company, 
Attn: Cuong, demanding that a special shareholders meeting be held on March 
12, 2010 at 2:00 p.m. at the corporate offices of the Company (the "February 2010 
Demand"). This meeting was never held. (R. 1539 at 63-64; Ex. Pll). 
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34. On April 18, 2010, a meeting was held between Lavinia, Weiman, 
Olivia and Cuong at Weiman's restaurant, the purpose of which was to discuss 
and resolve disputes over the ownership of the market, including obtaining a 
valuation of the store. (R. 1538 at 102-103; R. 1540 at 189-191). 
35. This meeting was set up by Lavinia. (R. 1539 at 74-74). 
36. Muoi was not invited to this meeting because she claimed, at that 
time, to have sold all of her shares to Weiman. (R. 1537 at 90; R. 1539 at 76). 
37. The Company attempted to hold a special shareholders meeting on 
April 19, 2010, but Cuong was the only shareholder in attendance and thus no 
business was conducted. (Exs. D13, D14 & D15; R. 1539 at 68-74; R. 1541 at 110-
113). 
38. Muoi was not invited to this meeting because she was not believed 
to hld any shares, having already attempted to sell them to Weiman. (R. 1537 at 
90; 1539 at 71; R. 1541 at 112). 
39. In 2011, it was determined that Olivia was taking money and/or 
inventory from the supermarket. As a result of this discovery, Olivia's 
employment with the Company was terminated. (R. 1541 at 29-32, 105-107, 158). 
40. Since Olivia's termination in 2011, the supermarket has been 
operated entirely by Cuong and his children, including Sylvia. (R. 1539 at 121-
124). 
10 
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41. On April 11, 2011, counsel for Plaintiffs sent the Company, Attn: 
Cuong and Sylvia, a letter demanding that a special shareholders meeting be 
convened at the corporate offices of the Company no later than July 1, 2011 (the 
"April 2011 Demand"). This meeting was never held. (R. 1537 at 70-71; R. 1538 
at 32-33; Ex. P15). 
42. On July 17, 2013, Lavinia entered into a Stock Interest Redemption 
Agreement pursuant to which the Company agreed to redeem her 20,000 shares 
for $138,000. (Ex. D19. See also R. 1539 at 104-106 (Cuong testimony regarding 
transaction with Lavinia); R. 1541 at 36-41 (Sylvia testimony regarding 
negotiations with Lavinia.)) 
RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS' INACCURATE STATEMENTS OF FACT 
Appellants set forth a statement of facts that is inaccurate and blatantly 
'4) ignores contrary evidence in the record: 
SOF 4: "Cuong Trang then used the 
money invested by Muoi Ha and Olivia 
Ha to pay off the loans he received 
from family members." 
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Cuong Trang testified that the loan for 
the purchase of the market came from 
his uncle. (R. 1538 at 124). His wife, 
Pamela Trang, testified that the loan 
from Cuong' s uncle was never repaid 
because the uncle told them not to do 
so. (R. 1542 at 79-80). Pamela Trang 
also testified that there was an 
additional $328,000 in inventory that 
they had to purchase from the prior 
owner of the market over time. (R. 
1542 at 80). 
Although Cuong testified that the 
money he received from Muoi was 
used to pay off a loan (R. 1539 at 138), 
there is no testimony indicating that it 
was the loan from his uncle, as 
opposed to the loan for the inventory 
that had to be paid back under the 
terms of the acquisition from Long Xa. 
Regarding Olivia Ha, Mr. Trang 
testified that the money was invested 
into the market. (R. 1539 at 139). There 
is no testimony that the money from 
Olivia was used to pay back the loan 
Cuong obtained from his uncle. 
Regardless, there is no dispute that 
Muoi and Olivia both contributed 
money to the market and held shares in 
the market. The only dispute was 
whether Weiman and Lavinia were 
also shareholders and, if so, how many 
shares they each owned. 
SOF 7: "Olivia Ha testified that There is no such testiinony at R. 1538, 
Weiman Ha gave money for the market page 54. 
but that she did not know how much." 
SOF 14: "The evidence was 
contradictory as to whether Tax Form 
2553 was filed with the IRS. Cuong 
Trang and Sylvia Trang stated that it 
had not been filed with the IRS .... 
However Sylvia Trang testified that 
Tax Form 2553 was filed with the IRS 
when the Corporation filed its taxes in 
2009." 
Sylvia never testified that Tax Form 
2553 was filed with the IRS. She 
testified that information contained on 
the form was used in preparing the tax 
returns for certain years, and that this 
was done on the advice of the 
Company's accountants. (R. 1541 at 
139). When Sylvia testified at 1541 
page 141 that a document was filed 
with the IRS she was referring to the 
tax returns themselves (not the Tax 
12 
SOF 17: "Cuong Trang also testified 
that he revoked Weiman Ha's ability to 
write checks on the Corporate 
account." 
SOF 24: "Cuong Trang and Sylvia 
Trang testified that Muoi Ha was 
removed from the operation of the 
Corporation for stealing around 
September 27, 2007." 
SOF 43: "Defendant Sylvia Trang 
testified that Ellen Ha originally 
created these documents." 
SOF 44: "Defendant Sylvia Trang then 
disposed of the old computer donating 
it to DI later that year." 
SOF 54: "At trial, Defendant Sylvia 
Trang testified that the stock 
certificates and minute books were still 
missing." 
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Form 2553). Indeed, Sylvia testified 
that she did not believe the original Tax 
Form 2553 had ever been filed because 
it was, in fact, given to her by Ellen in 
2006. (R. 1541 at 125-126). 
There is no such testimony on 1538 
page 44. Indeed, it is Olivia, not 
Cuong, who is testifying on that page. 
Nor does Exhibit D6 refer to this issue. 
The testimony on 1539 pages 53-55 
does not refer to when Muoi was 
removed from the Company. The cited 
testimony relates soley to when Exhibit 
D12 was prepared. The testimony on 
1541 page 86 merely states that Muoi 
was terminated in 2007. It does not 
give a specific month. 
Sylvia testified that Ellen created the 
original version of D6, but that Sylvia 
herself created the original version of 
Dll. (R. 1541 at 126-129, 132). 
Sylvia testified that the computer was 
donated to DI (R. 1541 at 131, 186), but 
there is no evidence that it was Sylvia 
that made the donation (as opposed to 
another member of the household). 
Sylvia is not testifying at 1538 page 80. 
And what she actually testified was 
that some (not all) of the corporate 
minutes and other corporate 
documents were still missing. (R. 1541 
at 80). 
SOF 56: "Defendant Sylvia Trang 
testified that she saw the physical stock 
certificates that were issued by the 
Corporation in 1999" 
SOF 59: "Defendant Cuong Trang and 
Defendant Sylvia Trang presented 
evidence that Lavinia Ha owned either 
4,215, 4390, 15,700 or 20,000 shares .... 
Defendant Cuong Trang testified that 
Lavinia Ha gave Weiman Ha 15,700 of 
her shares." 
What Sylvia testified was that she was 
sitting next to Ellen when Company 
stock certificates were being prepared, 
and that she the ref ore believed they 
were issued. (R. 1541 at 176-177). 
There is no evidence in the record, 
however, of any stock certificates ever 
being signed by the President or 
Secretary of the Company and 
delivered to the shareholders. Indeed, 
Cuong testified that stock was issued 
"verbally." (R. 1539 at 37). 
This grossly misstates the record. The 
Trangs testified that they did not know 
where the references to 4,215 and 4,390 
on D6 and Dl 1 came frmn, and didn't 
know if it was some sort of conversion 
that was used by Ellen. (R. 1539, 144). 
Cuong testified was that Lavinia 
wanted Wieman to have some of her 
originally anticipated shares. (R. 1539 
at 35). But there was no testimony that 
this was all of her shares, or that this 
15,700 was part of her 20,000 shares. 
To the contrary, Cuong testified that 
while Lavinia was originally granted a 
certain number of shares, she quickly 
(within a week) decided that she 
wanted some of those shares {15,700) to 
go to Weiman Ha. (R. 1539 at 35-36, 
120-121). 
Cuong Trang and Sylvia Trang testified 
consistently that Lavinia Ha held 
20,000 shares. 
SOF 60: "At no point during the Although Lavinia did not appear and 
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litigation, did Lavinia Ha ever assert to 
the Court that she owned shares of the 
Corporation." 
SOF 62: "When questioned about the 
accuracy of the tax returns, both 
Defendant Cuong Trang and 
Defendant Sylvia Trang pied the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-
incrimination rather than respond to a 
question about the accuracy of the tax 
returns." 
testify in court, she represented 
through the proxy documents and the 
Redemption Agreement, which were 
admitted as a business record of 
Southeast Supermarket, that she held 
shares in the Company. (Ex. D6, D11, 
D19). There is also other evidence in 
the record to establish her ownership of 
these shares. See infra at 18-20. 
Defendants offered testimony 
·regarding the tax returns. Sy I via 
specifically testified that the tax returns 
were prepared using the information 
on Tax Form 2553 even though such 
information was believed to be 
inaccurate, based on the advice of the 
Company's tax accountants. (R. 1541 at 
81-83, 84, 139-141, 142). She also 
testified that the Company intended to 
amend the tax returns, and file the 
remainder of the Company's tax 
required returns, after a judicial 
determination on the ownership of the 
Company was made. (R. 1541 at 84-
86). The Fifth Amendment privilege 
was asserted sparingly, and only after 
significant testimony on the issue had 
already been provided (R. 1540 at 37, 
41; R. 1542 at 70). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING THE 
OWNERSHIP AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE COMP ANY'S SHARES 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
In considering an insufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court reviews 
'"the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the 
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light most favorable'" to the decision of the trial court. State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 
10 ,r 30, 326 P.3d 645 ( quoting State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ,r 302, 299 P.3d 892 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). "So long as some evidence and reasonable 
inferences support the [trial court's] findings" they should not be disturbed on 
appeal. Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998). 
A. Plaintiffs Failed to Marshall the Evidence in Support of the 
Findings and Cannot Therefore Meet Their Burden of Persuasion 
on Appeal. 
As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of persuasion 
on appeal because they f~iled to properly marshal the evidence in support of the 
trial _court's findings of fact.3 Althou~,h Plaintiffs acknowledge the obligation, 
they do nothing to actually meet the requirement.4 Rather, they select the 
evidence that is most favorable to their position, entirely ignoring the evidence 
supporting the trial court's factual findings. Indeed, Plaintiffs carefully cull the 
record to eliminate any reference to the overwhelming evidence supporting the 
trial court's decision, acting as if such evidence was never there. As a result, 
Plaintiffs cannot overcome the "healthy dose of deference owed to factual 
3 See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (a party challenging a finding must address and 
explain away the record evidence that supports the challenged finding). 
4 In 2014, the Utah Supreme Court clarified that marshalling is not a procedural 
requirement, the failure of which can result in dismissal of the appeal. State v. 
Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,r,r 40-42. Rather, marshalling is a substantive obligation, 
necessary to meet the burden of persuasion under the clearly erroneous 
standard. Id. at ,r 41. 
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findings" and cannot persuade this Court to reverse the Final Judgment. See State 
v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,r,i 40-42 ("[A] party who fails to identify and deal with 
supportive evidence will never persuade an appellate court to reverse under the 
deferential standard of review that applies to such issues."). 
B. There Was Sufficient Evidence to Support the Trial Court's 
Factual Findings Regarding the Number and Distribution of 
Shares. 
Plaintiffs' failure to marshal the evidence is only exacerbated by their 
failure to identify the specific trial court findings they claim to be erroneous. 
Their brief states simply that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial 
court's findings "regarding the distribution of shares among the shareholders." 
Br. at 29. Thus, it would appear that Plaintiffs object to Finding of Fact No. 15, . 
which provides as follows: 
On or before March 24, 1999, it was initially determined 
that shares in the Company would be issued as follows: 
Cuong: 65,000; Muoi: 40,000; Lavinia: 35,700; Olivia: 
5,000. Lavinia later determined however, that she 
wanted 15,700 of her anticipated shares to be issued to 
her brother, Weiman, in recognition of the work he had 
been doing at the market. It was therefore agreed that 
the shares of the Company would be issued as follows: 
Cuong: 65,000; Muoi: 40,000; Lavinia: 20,000; Weiman: 
15,700; Olivia: 5,000. 
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Specifically, Plaintiffs appear to challenge the trial court's finding that Lavinia 
received 20,000 shares, and that Weiman received only 15,700 shares.5 
In so doing, Plaintiff's ignore the substantial evidence offered in support of 
the trial court's findings, including the following: 
• Testimony from Cuong that Lavinia was part of the original 
discussions to incorporate the market (R. 1538 at 138); 
• Corporate minutes from March 23, 1999 identifying the original 
shareholders as Lavinia, Olivia, Muoi and Cuong (Ex. D05),6 and 
Cuong' s testimony that those were the four originally identified 
shareholders and that Weiman was added after the fact (R. 1539 at 
34, 36); 
• Cuong' s testimony that Lavinia held 20,000 shares (Id. at 35, 103-04); 
• 
• 
Sylvia's testimony that she was physically present when the 
decisions regarding the shareholders and the number of shares were 
made, and that Lavinia held 20,000 shares (R. 1541 at 118); 
The Revocable Proxy document signed by Lavinia and dated March 
23, 1999, identifying Lavinia as a shareholder and appointing 
Weiman as her proxy with respect to her shares (Ex. D06); 
• The fact that Cuong discussed his intent to remove Weiman as a 
Director with Lavinia (R. 1539 at 48); 
5 There was no dispute that Cuong held 65,000 shares and that Olivia held 5,000 
shares. Although the Defendants argued that Muoi' s 40,000 shares reverted back 
to the Company due to an unauthorized sale to Weiman, the trial court found 
that Muoi was not aware of the sale restrictions and that the shares therefore 
remained in her possession. Defendants have not appealed from that r1:1ling, and 
thus do not dispute that Muoi owns 40,000 shares. 
6 Plaintiffs did not appeal the admission of these minutes. 
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• 
• 
The December 10, 2004 letter to shareholders informing them that 
Weiman had been removed as a director (Ex. 010), a copy of which 
was mailed to Lavinia as a shareholder (R. 1539 at 46-47);7 
The fact that this same letter was specifically discussed with Lavinia 
(R. 1539 at 48); 
• The Revocation of Proxy document signed by Lavinia and dated 
December 10, 2004, identifying herself as a shareholder and 
revoking all previously issued proxies to Weiman (Ex. D11); 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
The April 12, 2010 notice of special shareholder meeting addressed 
to Lavinia (Ex. D13), which was mailed to Lavinia, as a shareholder, 
that same day (R. 1539 at 69-70);8 
Olivia Ha's testimony that she asked Lavinia on numerous occasions 
to come to Salt Lake City for shareholder meetings. (R. 1538 at 54). 
The fact that Lavinia came to Salt Lake City to attend a meeting at 
South China House with Cuong, Weiman and Olivia on April 19, 
2010, the purpose of which was to resolve disputes over claimed 
ownership of shares in the Company .(R. 1538 at 102-103; R. 1540 at 
189-91); 
The fact that the Company repurchased Lavinia's 20,000 shares in 
July 2013 for $138,000, after obtaining an appraisal to determine the 
value of the company and the value of Lavinia's shares (R. 1539 at 
104-06; R. 1541 at 40-41);9 
The Shareholder Interest Redemption Agreement dated July 17, 2013 
and signed by Lavinia, stating that she is a shareholder of 20,000 
shares, that Weiman was inappropriately claiming ownership of her 
7 Plaintiffs do not appeal from the admission of this letter. 
8 Plaintiffs do not appeal from the admission of this evidence. 
9 Although Plaintiffs appeal from the admission of the actual Shareholder 
Interest Redemption Agreement, they did not object to and do not appeal from 
the admission of Cuong' s and Sylvia's testimony regarding the transaction. 
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• 
• 
• 
shares, and that she desired to sell these shares back to the Company 
(D19); 
Cuong's testimony that Tax Form 2553 was never filed with the IRS 
because it was erroneous insofar as it identified Weiman has holding 
37,500 shares when; in fact, 20,000 of those shares belonged to 
Lavinia (R. 1539 at 120-121); 
Sylvia's testimony that she was present when Ellen filled out Tax 
Form 2553, and that Weiman instructed Ellen to identify him as the 
owner of 35,700 shares, which included 20,000 shares actually 
belonging to Lavinia, because Lavinia was not there and thus he 
"had say" over her shares (R. 1541 at 122-124); 
Sylvia's testimony that Wejman told her it was stupid for her to go 
to California in July 2013 (when the Company bought back Lavinia's 
20,000 shares) because Weiman would not have taken Lavinia's 
20,000 shares and would have given those shares back to. Lavinia. 
(Id. at 119-120). 
Weiman's admission that all of his siblings living in the United 
States ~ad an interest in the market, either directly. or through their 
spouse, and that he did not leave Lavinia out. (R. 1540 at 110-112). 
Plaintiffs specifically object to the trial court's finding that Lavinia was 
originally granted 35,700 shares. Again, Plaintiffs ignore the actual evidence. As 
noted in the summary of the evidence in the immediately preceding pages, there 
was evidence establishing the original shareholders as Cuong, Lavinia, Muoi and 
Olivia. There was also evidence that Weiman was added as a shareholder a few 
days later, and given 15,700 of the shares originally intended for Lavinia. There 
is further evidence that Lavinia wanted to add Weiman to the list of 
shareholders, and wanted to give him some of her shares. Finally, there is 
evidence that Lavinia ultimately ended up with 20,000 shares. Based on all of 
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this evidence, it was reasonable, and not clearly erroneous, for the trial court to 
infer that Lavinia was originally slated to receive 35,700 shares, that she gave 
15,700 of those shares to Weiman, and that she retained the remaining 20,000.10 
Plaintiffs also appear to object to Finding of Fact No. 15, stating as follows: 
Plaintiffs attempted to establish the allocation of shares 
by use of the Election of S Corporation, Tax Form 2553 
(the "Election Form"). The Court does not find that 
this document is evidence of the proper allocation of 
shares in the Company. The Election Form dated on 
March 24, 1999 was prepared in handwriting by 
someone other than Cuong, Weiman, Muoi and Olivia. 
Those four parties testified that the Election Form was 
not prepared in their own handwriting. This form 
showed a different allocation of shares and was 
originally signed by the parties. This document was 
never filed with the IRS. Sylvia testified that while she 
was living with Ellen, Ellen prepared this form at 
Weiman's direction. In November 2006, Ellen found the 
Election Form in her files when she moved to 
Washington and mailed it to Sylvia. 
But there was evidence in the record to support this finding, including: 
• 
• 
Sylvia's testimony that while the form identifies the Company as an 
S Corporation, the Company is actually a C Corporation (R. 1541 at 
126); 
Cuong, Muoi, Olivia and Weiman testified that they each signed the 
Tax Form 2553, but that the other handwriting on the form, 
including the handwriting setting forth the number of shares, did 
not belong to them (R. 1537 at 133; R. 1538 at 56; R. 1540 at 95-96); 
10 This inference is further supported by evidence that Weiman told Ellen to 
identify him as the holder of the 35,700 when 20,000 of those shares actually 
belonged to Lavinia. (R. 1541 at 122-124). 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Sylvia's testimony that she lived with Ellen for a period of time and 
frequently saw her writing, and that the writing on the Tax Form 
2553, and in particular the writing depicting the number of shares, 
belonged to Ellen (R. 1541 at 120-123); 
Sylvia's testimony that she was present when Ellen prepared the Tax 
Form 2553, and that it was filled out based on directions from 
Weiman (Id. at 122-123); 
Sylvia's testimony that she heard Weiman tell Ellen to add Lavinia's 
20,000 shares to his 15,700 shares, and to identify him as the holder 
of 35,700 shares (Id. at 123-124); 
Sylvia's testimony that when Ellen moved from Utah to Washington 
in 2006 she located the original Tax Farm 2553 in her files and 
mailed it to Sylvia (Id. at 125); and 
Sylvia's testimony that the original Tax Form 2553 was in an 
envelope addressed to the IRS, but that the envelope did not contain 
any markings indicating that it had ever been mailed to the IRS (Id. 
at 126). 
Plaintiffs ignore all of this evidence in arguing that the trial court's findings were 
clearly erroneous. 
Plaintiffs claim that the stock breakdown set forth in Tax Form 2553 was 
supported by the corporate tax filings made in 2009. Again, Plaintiffs ignore 
evidence as to why the tax returns contained this information. Specifically, 
Plaintiffs ignore the unrefuted testimony from Sylvia that the tax filings were 
prepared using the information on Tax Form 2553 on the advice of the Company 
accountants, because the Company was under the gun to file overdue returns, 
and the form was the only documentation in their physical possession at the time 
purporting to identify the shareholders and the number of shares held. (R. 1541 
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at 81-82, 84, 141). Plaintiffs also ignore Sylvia's testimony that the accountants 
advised her not to amend the returns with the correct shareholder information 
until a judicial determination had been made regarding the actual ownership of 
the Company's shares, in order to avoid having repeated amendments to the 
filings. (R. 1541 at 84). In short, there was ample evidence from which the trial 
,;; court could reasonably conclude that the tax returns did not accurately reflect the 
shareholders or the number of shares held because they were based entirely on 
the Tax Form 2553, which was itself inaccurate. 
Plaintiffs claim that Tax Form 2553 was supported by the testimony of 
Cuong, stating that he and Muoi, Olivia and Weiman were original shareholders. 
But there is nothing in the cited testimony whereby Cuong states that these four 
individuals were the only original shareholders. Defendants asserted 
throughout the proceedings that Lavinia was one of the original shareholders. 
See Defendants' Rule 26 Initial Disclosures, App'x C hereto (identifying Lavinia 
vi> as a person with information regarding "[a]cquisition and ownership of shares of 
Southeast Supermarket").11 And there was ample evidence to establish that 
viJ Lavinia indeed held 20,000 shares. See supra at 18-20. 
11 Defendants also asserted Lavinia's ownership of the shares during the first 
mediation, which was held in July 2012. 
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C. The Trial Court's Credibility Determinations Were Not Clearly 
Erroneous. 
Plaintiffs suggest that the trial court's findings should be reversed because 
it determined that the Trangs were the more credible witnesses. But '"[i]t is the 
province of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses,"' and this Court 
"will not second-guess the trial court where there is a reasonable basis to support 
its findings." Woodward v. Lafranca, 2013 UT App 147, ,r 7, 305 P.3d 181 (quoting 
Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1991)); see also State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 
345 (Utah 1985) ("'It is the exclusive function of [the trier of fact] to weigh the 
evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.' (quoting State v. 
Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980)). A trial court's determination of credibility 
will be reversed only if "its findings in support of that determination are 'clearly 
erroneous,"' meaning that those findings are '"against the clear weight of the 
evidence,"' or if the "appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made." Woodward, 2013 UT App 147, ,r 7 
(quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). 
There was a reasonable basis for the trial court to discredit the testimony of 
Plaintiffs, its findings were not clearly erroneous or against the clear weight of 
the evidence, and there is no basis for this court to reach a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made. 
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Regarding Muoi, there was evidence establishing that she stole -money 
from the Company (see supra at 9, Appellees' Statement of Fact 131), even though 
she denied it on the stand. (R. 1537 at 105). Muoi also testified that it was her 
husband that started Global Supermarket to compete with the Company, despite 
prior sworn and other admissions that it was her store. (Id. at 111-117; R. 1539 at 
62; see also Ex. D38 at 5; Ex P10). Finally, Muoi claimed not to know about 
Weiman's removal as a Director (R. 1537 at 74), despite Weiman's own testimony 
that she (and everyone else) was aware of his removal. (R. 1540 at 116). 
Regarding Olivia, she testified that she did not discuss her concerns about 
the Trangs' operation of the business with Muoi in 2011, despite directly contrary 
statements in her Verified Complaint. (R. 1538 at 61-64; D38 at 6). Olivia also 
claimed not to remember when she divorced her own husband. (R. 1538 at 44-
46). And like Muoi, Olivia denied knowing about Weiman's removal as a 
Director (id. at 24-25), despite Weiman's own testimony that she (and everyone 
vJ else) was aware. (R. 1540 at 116). 
Regarding Weiman, he testified that he changed the name of the market 
from Tay Do to New Tay Do, and that this was done a year after the market 
opened, in 1998. (Id. at 73-76). But records on file with the Division of 
Corporations confirm that the name was changed by Cuong in 1997, before 
Weiman even moved back to Salt Lake. (Id. at 77). Weiman claimed in the 
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Verified Complaint that he was the one that prepared Tax Form 2553,12 but 
testified at trial that it was Cuong. (Id. at 52). In fact, the overwhelming evidence 
in the record supports the conclusion that it was prepared by his daughter, Ellen. 
(See supra at 21). Indeed, Weiman's testimony regarding Tax Form 2553, and 
Ellen's involvement therein, was evasive at best. (R. 1540 at 104-105). Weiman 
claimed not to know about his removal as Director (id. at 60), despite his own 
claim that his sisters and everyone else knew (id. at 116), and despite evidence 
that he was informed of such in a letter from Cuong. (Id. at 44-47; Ex. D9). 
Weiman also claimed to have been the one that negotiated the deal for the 
original acquisition of the market, but was unable to provide any specific details 
regarding the terms of the deal. (Id. at 115-116).13 Finally, Weiman told counsel 
to "eat shit" when pressed on certain issues during cross-examination. (R. 1540 
at 78-79). 
Plaintiffs claim that the trial court's credibility determinations were clearly 
erroneous because they were based on irrelevant evidence. There are multiple 
problems with this argument. First, Plaintiffs fail to identify the specific 
12 Weiman also claimed to be the author of Tax Form 2553 in the course of 
discovery. (R. 1540 at 91-92). 
13 Indeed, Weiman referred to the selling party as "Tay Do", when in fact that 
was the name of the business. (R. 1540 at 48). The selling party was named Long 
Xa. (R. 1538 at 124). 
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allegedly irrelevant evidence that was improperly considered by the trial court in 
making its credibility determinations.14 Thus, this Court has no way to assess 
whether the evidence in question was relevant or not. Second, Plaintiffs cite to 
nothing in the record to suggest that they objected to the allegedly irrelevant 
evidence when it was offered below. Because they failed to establish that they 
~ preserved the relevance issue below, the issue cannot be considered on appeal. 
Brady v. Park, 2013 UT App 97, ,r 38, 302 P.3d 1220 (to be preserved for appeal, an 
issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an 
opportunity to rule on that issue (quotations and citations omitted)). Third, 
Plaintiffs believe that that relevance may be determined only with respect to 
their own theories of the case. In fact, relevance must be determined considering 
the case as a whole, based not only on the plaintiff's claims but also on the 
defenses asserted in the defendant's answer .15 
14 Plaintiffs likely object to evidence of their theft and embezzlement. But it was 
the Plaintiffs who put this misconduct at issue by alleging they were fired, and 
forced out of the business, without cause. (R. at 207-209). Having opened this 
door, they cannot complain that such evidence was admitted and considered by 
the trail court. 
15 Plaintiffs note that Defendants did not file any counterclaims. They did, 
however, file an answer setting forth a number of affirmative defenses. (R. 276-
286) 
27 
D. Plaintiffs' Claims of Inconsistent Testimony by the Trangs Are 
Flawed and Do Not Require Reversal on Appeal. 
Plaintiffs claim that the Trangs' testimony should be discredited because 
their testimony was "inconsistent."16 But their claims of inconsistency do not 
withstand scrutiny. 
1. The Trangs Did Not Offer Inconsistent Testimony 
Regarding the Existence of Stock Certificates. 
Plaintiffs suggest that there was an inconsistency with respect to the 
existence of stock certificates. Specifically, they assert that Cuong testified there 
were no physical stock certificates, while Sylvia claimed that such certificates 
were issued. Plaintiffs misconstrue Sylvia's testimony in order to create an 
inconsistency that does not exist. What Sylvia testified was that she was sitting 
next to Ellen when she was preparing stock certificates (R. 1541 at 176-177). 
Sylvia never testified that such certificates were ever actually signed or delivered 
to Plaintiffs (or other shareholders).17 This testimony is consistent with the 
testimony of Cuong that he believed certificates were prepared, but that they 
were never signed (R. 1539 at 37), and that shares were only issued "verbally." 
(Id.). 
16 Insofar as Plaintiffs are attempting to establish such inconsistencies through 
their statement of facts, those inconsistencies have been addressed in above. See 
supra at 11-15. 
17 When asked if the certificates were issued, Sylvia stated she "believed so" 
because she was there when they were prepared. (R. 1541 at 176-177). 
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2. The Trangs Did Not Offer Inconsistent Testimony 
Regarding the Number of Shares Held by Lavinia. 
Plaintiffs note that thew Trangs could not explain the discrepancy between 
the stock figures set forth on D6 and D11 (the proxy documents), which identify 
Lavinia's holdings as 4,215 and 4,390, and the Trangs' testimony that she owned 
20,000. The evidence is undisputed, however, that the original proxy document 
(D6) was created by Ellen, and that the Trangs did not know where Ellen 
obtained the share numbers contained on those proxy documents. (R. 1539 at 
~ 139). The Trangs were consistent in testifying that Lavinia invested $20,000 and 
held 20,000 shares. (R. 1539 at 35; R. 1541 at 118). And this number is confirmed 
through the representations and warranties set forth in the Redemption 
Agreement that was signed by Lavinia in July 2013. (D19). While the_ evidence 
may have been conflicting, there was ample evidence for the trial court to 
conclude that the correct figure was 20,000 (rather than either of the figures set 
forth on Exhibits D6 and D11). 
3. The Defendants Did Not Offer Inconsistent Testimony 
Regarding Weiman Ha's Possession of Corporate Records. 
Plaintiffs claim that the Trangs lied when they suggested, in response to 
Plaintiffs' demands for a meeting, that Plaintiffs (and Weiman in particular) had 
corporate records and stock certificates in his possession. But the evidence 
supported the Trangs' belief that such documents existed and were in the 
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possession of Weiman. Cuong and Sylvia both testified that Weiman delivered 
boxes of q.ocuments to them after they requested such information in order to 
complete the tax filings. (R. 1541 at 49-62). And there are contemporaneously 
created business records to support these claims. (D23). Finally, Sylvia provided 
extensive testimony regarding the discovery of corporate documents in the 
Weiman' s "little room," as follows: 
• 
• 
• 
Weiman built the little room in a back corner of the warehouse at the 
back of the market (R. 1541 at 65, 68); 
Weiman had a bed in the room and was the only one that used the 
room (Id. at 66, 68); 
Weiman had the only key, which he threw away when he was fired 
from the Company (R. 1539 at 176-177; R. 1540 at 83-84; R. 1541 at 
65-66; see also R. 1540 at 82 (Weiman had a key but was "not sure 
about the others"); 
Sylvia hired Glen's Key Lock and Safe to open the door to Weiman's 
little room because Weiman was not cooperating in the production 
of documents needed to complete the Company's tax returns (R. 
1541 at 63-66);18 
Sylvia and her cousin, Jonathan Trang (Olivia's son), entered the 
room after it was unlocked (Id. at 66-67); 
• There were boxes of documents scattered throughout the room, and 
there were also documents strewn about on the bed and elsewhere 
(Id. at 68-69, 73-74); 
18 Plaintiffs criticized Sylvia for not having the room unlocked earlier. But Sylvia 
testified that Chinese culture is hierarchical, that it is not customary for family 
members to question the patriarch (i.e., Weiman), and that she waited as long as 
she could out of respect for his position in the family. (R. 1541 at 173-74). 
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• 
• 
Some of the boxes contained invoices, bank statements, cleared 
checks, and other Company financial records (Id. at 68-69, 72-74); 
Other corporate documents, including corporate minutes, articles of 
incorporation and bylaws, were also found inside the room (Id. at 
72-74); 
• Not all of the documents Sylvia was attempting to find were located 
in the little room (Id. at 174-176; see also R. 1540 at 25); and 
• Some of the still missing documents included sales tax records, daily 
sales receipts, and additional corporate minutes (R. 1541 at 80). 
As discussed above, there was also evidence that Sylvia had a reason to believe 
that Ellen had prepared stock certificates, and that those draft certi!icates, even if 
unsigned and unissued, may have been in the possession of Weiman.19 (Supra at 
27-28). 
4. Defendants Did Not Offer Fabricated Proxy Documents. 
Plaintiffs claim that the Trangs fabricated evidence. Specifically, Plaintiffs 
refer to Exhibits D6 and D11 - the Revocable Proxy and Revocation of Proxy. But 
Sylvia offered extensive testimony regarding how those documents were created, 
~ and why they were mere duplicate copies of the originals rather than 
fa bric a tions: 
19 Defendants produced a series of unsigned stock certificates during the course 
of discovery. (SM000018-20). While these documents were not offered or 
received into evidence, it is disingenuous for Plaintiffs to suggest thaf the Trangs 
had no reason to believe there might be additional certificates, even draft and 
unsigned, in the possession of Weiman. 
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• Sylvia was present when Ellen prepared D6 (the Revocable Proxy) 
on a computer at the Trang ho1ne in 1999, and was also present 
when that document was signed by Lavinia (R. 1541 at 126-129); 
• Lavinia mailed the signed document to Cuong (R. 1539 at 37-38); 
Sylvia prepared D11 (the Revocation of Proxy) on a computer at the 
Trang home and sent the document to Lavinia for signing (R. 1541 at 
132); 
Cuong received the document, signed by Lavinia, in the mail (R. 
1540, 22-23); 
• Sylvia knew that the signed documer:its existed but could not locate 
them in Weiman's little room (or elsewhere) (R. 1541 at 129, 133); 
• 
• 
Sylvia found the original version of these documents on the 
computers located at the Trang home (Id. at 129); 
The computers were outdated and the orig~nal forms could not 
therefore be emailed or printed (Id. at 130, 134); 
• Sylvia retyped the original forms on her own computer and emailed 
them to Lavinia to be resigned (R. 1541 at 130-131, 135-136, 185-186); 
• 
• 
Sylvia received the documents, resigned by Lavinia, in the mail (R. 
1541 at 131, 136); and 
Sylvia did not disclose them as "reconstructions" or "re-creations" 
when they were produced and initially offered into evidence 
because she viewed them as mere copies of documents that she 
knew to already exist (Id. at 179; R. 1542 at 55-56). 
Plaintiffs claim that Sylvia cannot be trusted based on Cuong' s testimony that it 
was actually Lavinia that prepared D6 and D11. But it was within the discretion 
of the trial court to conclude that it was, in fact, Ellen who prepared the original 
Revocable Proxy (Ex. D6), and Sylvia who prepared the original Revocation of 
Proxy (Ex. D11), that those original documents were then sent to Lavinia for 
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signing, and to infer that Cuong incorrectly assumed it was Lavinia that drafted 
them after he received them in the mail from her. 
Ultimately, it was for the trial court to consider the evidence presented and 
determine whether or not the actions associated with these documents rendered 
the Trangs' testimony not credible. The trial court determined that it did not, 
~ and there was nothing clearly erroneous about this determination. 
5. Defendants Did Not Offer Inconsistent Testimony 
Regarding Sylvia Witnessing the Preparation of Tax Form 
2553 or the Execution of the Revocable Proxy by Lavinia. 
Plaintiffs challenge Sylvia's testimony that she was in the backroom of the 
market when Ellen prepared Tax Form 2553, claiming that this testimony 
conflicts with her claim that she was with Lavinia when she signed Exhibit D6 -
the proxy document. It was reasonable for the court to infer, however, that while 
JJ the proxy document is dated March 23, 1999, Lavinia did not actually sign the 
document until Ellen and Sylvia to California returned and gave it to her to sign. 
This inference is particularly reasonable given that the date on the proxy 
document was typed, rather than handwritten. All that Sylvia testified at trial 
was that she saw the document being signed by Lavinia in 1999 (R. 1541 at 127). 
Althought the document itself is dated and effective March 23, 1999, Sylvia never 
testified that she saw Lavinia sign the document on that sp·ecific date, as opposed 
to some date shortly thereafter. 
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6. Defendants Did Not Offer Inconsistent Testimony 
Regarding the Removal of Weiman as a Director. 
Plaintiffs claim that Cuong' s testimony regarding the removal of Weiman 
was inconsistent. Specifically, they claim that he could not have been removed 
as a Director on December 10, 2004, because he signed two checks thereafter-on 
December 24, 2004 and December 31, 2004, and because he was not removed as a 
Director with the Division of Corporations until March 8, 20i0. Once again, 
Plaintiffs pick and choose the evidence in the record to create an inconsistency 
that does not actually exist. 
The fact that Weiman continued to sign checks after December 10, 2004, 
does not mean that he was authorized to do so, or that he did so in the capacity 
of a Director of the Company. Indeed, the evidence establishes that even after 
Weiman was removed as a Director, he continued to work at the market as an 
employee. (R. 1541 at 173). The evidence further established that the checkbook 
was kept in a location where it could be easily accessed by Weiman during this 
period of time, and that Weiman had previously written checks outside of the 
presence of Cuong. (R. 1541 at 46-47). Thus, the fact that he continued to sign 
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checks even after he had been removed and told not to sign anymore does not 
mean that he was not removed and stripped of his check writing authority.20 
Likewise, the fact that the Company did not take steps to formally remove 
Weiman as a director with the Division of Corporations does not :r:nean that they 
did not take internal steps to remove him from his position. Sylvia testified that 
..; the only reason he was not removed from the State records sooner was because 
she didn't realize it was something that needed to be done until she was using 
vti> the online renewal service for the first time in 2010. (R. 1541 at 43-45). It was not 
unreasonable for the trial court to accept this testimony and conclude that 
Weiman had been removed from his position back in 2004, and that the 
Company simply failed to take the steps necessary to remove his name from the 
Division of Corporation records at that time.21 
20 Plaintiffs suggest that Weiman had the authority to sign the checks because he 
was a signatory on the account and there is no evidence that Cuong went to the 
bank to remove his name. While these facts may justify a bank's actions in 
~ cashing the check, they would not excuse VVeiman's unauthorized use of 
Company funds to pay for personal expenses and/ or the expenses of his 
restaurant. Such use of the Company funds would be improper even by an 
authorized signatory on the account, and would therefore justify termination. 
viJ 
21 Weiman could have taken steps to remove himself from the Division of 
Corporation records. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-l0a-1608; see also id. § 16-l0a-
807(3); id. § -808(5); id. § -809(4). 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPROPERLY ADMIT HEARSAY OR 
RELY ON HEARSAY STATEMENTS IN ITS FINDINGS. 
Plaintiffs incorrectly assert that the trial court should be reversed because 
it erroneously admitted hearsay testimony and then relied on the erroneously 
adm.itted testimony in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The trial 
court's decision on admissibility is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Workman, 2005 UT 66, ,r 10, 122 P.3d 639 (citing Eggert v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 
2004 UT 28, ,IlO, 94 P.3d 193). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting any evidence. 
Plaintiffs ask this Court to strike five paragraphs from the trial court's 
Findings of Fact-18, 29, 32, 33, and 47 -for purported improper reliance on 
hearsay statements. All of these paragraphs support the trial court's Conclusion 
of Law that Lavinia held shares in the corporation. 
Plaintiffs' arguments with respect to these paragraphs are flawed for 
several reasons, as explained in detail herein. First, the Has overlook that the fact 
that the ev~dence was properly admitted under the business records exception to 
the hearsay rule. Second, in some instances, Plaintiffs failed to even object to the 
purported hearsay testimony in the trial court, and thus they did not preserve 
their arguments for appeal. Finally, the evidence Plaintiffs assert was incorrectly 
admitted and relied on by the trial court was not in fact hearsay because it was 
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not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Each paragraph to which 
Plaintiffs object is addressed in turn below. 
A. Paragraph 18 of the Findings of Fact is Not Based on Improperly 
Admitted Hearsay. 
Paragraph 18 of the trial court's Findings of Fact states: 
On March 23, 1999, Lavinia, who lived and worked in 
California, executed a proxy authorizing her brother, 
Weiman, to vote her shares in the Company in her 
absence. Unlike the other Ha family members, Lavinia 
was not involved in the day-to-day running of the 
market. Sylvia testified that she was also living with 
Lavinia at the time, and Lavinia showed her the 
document and explained it to her. Cuong also testified 
that he received the signed proxy mailed from Lavinia 
around that time. 
App'x A at 4. Plaintiffs objected to the admission of the Revoca~le Proxy 
document (Exhibit D6) demonstrating that Lavinia authorized Weiman to vote 
v;;) her shares in the company in her absence. However, the document was properly 
admitted as a business record. (R. 1539 at 38-39). Utah Rule of Evidence 803(6) 
provides that records of regularly conducted activity of a business is not 
excluded by the hearsay rule if: 
(A) the record was made at or near the time by-or 
from information transmitted by-someone with 
knowledge; (B) the record was kept in the ordinary 
course of a regularly conducted activity of a business, 
organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for 
profit; (C) making the record was a regular practice of 
that activity; (D) all these conditions are shown by the 
testimony of the custodian or another qualified witness 
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. . . and (E) neither the source of information nor the 
method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack 
of trustworthiness. 
Utah R. Evid. 803(6). All of these requirements are satisfied here, as Cuong, the 
Company president and one of its records custodian, testified that the proxy 
documents were kept by the market in the regular and ordinary course of 
business, and keeping such records was the Company's regular practice. (R. 
1539 at 38-39). The testimony also demonstrated that the Revocable Proxy was 
signed by Lavinia near the time it was created. (R. 1539 at 37-38, 40; R. 1541 at 
126-129); see also Section I(D)(4) supra. Nor is there anything in the record to 
indicate a lack of trustworthiness such that it was an abuse of discretion for the 
trial court to admit the document under the exception. 22 
Even if in error, the admission of the Revocable Proxy (Ex. D6) would be 
harmless given that there was ample non-hearsay evidence demonstrating the 
fact that Lavinia owned shares in the Company. See Section I(B) supra; see also In 
re J.C., 808 P.2d 1131, 1136 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that harmless error 
22 Plaintiffs argue that the Revocable Proxy (D6) and Revocation of Proxy (D11) 
documents are not trustworthy because they were "fabricated" by Sylvia. 
However, Sylvia testified extensively about the original creation of these 
documents and the need to re-create the originals, which were known to exist 
but could not be located in Weiman's little room (or elsewhere), for proper 
recordkeeping purposes. The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, found 
this testimony credible, and that decision should be affirmed. See Section I(D)( 4) 
supra. 
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doctrine applied to appellant's claim that juvenile court improperly admitted 
hearsay evidence when other non-hearsay evidence supported the juvenile 
court's conclusions). 
B. Paragraph 29 of the Findings of Fact is Not Based on Improperly 
Admitted Hearsay. 
Paragraph 29 of the trial court's Findings of Fact states: 
Around this same time, Lavinia revoked the proxy she 
had given to Weiman to vote her shares in the 
company. The proxy revocation was mailed to and 
received by Cuong [Trang]. 
App'x A at 6. Like the Revocable Proxy document discussed above, this 
Revocation of Proxy Document (Ex. D11) was properly admitted by the trial 
court as a business record. (R. 1539 at 50). Proper foundation was laid by Cuong 
about this document being regularly kept in the course of business. (R. 1539 at 
~ 48-50). Cuong also testified that he recognized Lavinia's signature on the 
document, that Lavinia mailed the document to him, and that the revocation of 
proxy was the type of document that the market keeps and maintains in the 
regular and ordinary course of business. (Id.; see also Section I(D)(4) supra). 
Moreover, there is no indication that the document lacks trustworthiness such 
that it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to admit the document into 
evidence. (See note 17, supra). Finally, like the Revocable Proxy document 
discussed above, the admission of this Revocation of Proxy document, even if it 
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was erroneous (though it was not), is subject to the harmless error doctrine given 
that ample non-hearsay evidence supported the finding that Lavinia Ha owned 
shares in the Company. See Section I(B) supra. 
C. Paragraphs 32 and 33 of the Findings of Fact are Not Based on 
Impr~perly Admitted Hearsay. 
Paragraphs 32 and 33 of the trial court's Findings of Fact state: 
32. In May 2009, Cuong and Sylvia discovered that 
the tax filings had not been filed with the federal 
government and state. 
33. The Company later filed several tax returns based 
on the incomplete corporate records, including the 
Election form, and incorrectly stated the stock 
shareholders [held] in the Company. The Court finds 
the testimony credible that the Company was waiting, 
on the advice of the accounting professionals, for the 
Court's determination of ownership. 
App'x A at 7. Plaintiffs argue that the court erroneously allowed in hearsay 
evidence about what the letters from the taxing authorities stated and also about 
the advice of the accounting professionals. (Br. at 27-28). 
With respect to paragraph 32, Plaintiffs failed to object to this evidence and 
their argument is therefore not preserved. Brady v. Park, 2013 UT App 97, ,r 38, 
302 P.3d 1220 (to be preserved for appeal, an issue must be presented to the trial 
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue 
(quotations and citations omitted)). The following exchange took place at trial 
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. ..c) 
when counsel for the Trangs was conducting the direct examination of Sylvia 
Trang: 
Q. Did there come a time when you learned that tax 
returns · had not been filed on behalf of Southeast 
Supermarket? 
A. Yes. 
Q . When did you learn this? 
A. That was May 2009? 
Q. And how did you learn this? 
A. We learned about it through a letter through-
that was sent to Southeast by the Utah State Tax 
Commission. 
(R. 1541 at 49.) Counsel for Plaintiffs did not object until later, after counsel for 
the Trangs asked what the letter from the Utah State Tax Commission actually 
stated. Id. at 49-50. Paragraph 32, which merely addresses the afact that the lack 
of tax filings was discovered, is therefore fully supported by the testimony 
quoted above to which no objection was lodged. 
The findings articulated by the trial court in Paragraph 32 are also 
supported by the corporate minutes in Exhibit D23, which contain statements 
. .J about the company receiving notice from the taxing authorities that taxes had not 
been filed by Southeast. The minutes were properly admitted by the trial court as 
business records. (R. 1541 at 53-55). Again, the admission of these records under 
Utah Rule of Evidence 803(6) was proper because foundation was laid that the 
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minutes were created by Sylvia on the same day that the meeting was held, that 
the record was kept in the ordinary course of a regularly conducted activity of 
the business, that making the record was a regular practice of that activity. (R. 
1541 at 50-54). In addition, there is no evidence indicating that the corporate 
minutes in Exhibit D23 suffer from a lack of trustworthiness. The trial court did 
not, therefore, err in making its findings in paragraph 32. 
Regarding Paragraph 33, Plaintiffs argue that this finding is based on 
hearsay because it relies on out-of-court statements of accountants who advised 
the company not to file amended tax returns listing Lavinia as a shareholder 
until ownership of the Company was determined in court. For several reasons, 
Plaintiffs' argument with respect to Paragraph 33 fails. 
First, counsel for Plaintiffs failed to object to the introduction of this 
testimony. The following exchange took place when Defendnats' counsel was 
conducting the examination of Sylvia: 
Q. Did you believe that Lavinia was a shareholder at 
the time that the tax returns were prepared? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. So why does she not appear in the tax returns? 
A. Because this was the only document and the best 
document that I could find at that time to prepare the 
tax returns .... And I was advised to file it as soon as I 
can, just to file it so it's there and that-and that we 
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could amend the records when we find the correct 
information. 
Q. So why haven't you amended your tax filings? 
A. Because of-of the rmss1ng minutes, the 
paperwork along the lines, and because where I was 
advised by accountants to- that we should wait 
because of this litigation, because of this lawsuit, and 
because we're waiting for a judicial ruling before we 
could actually re-file so we wouldn't have to constantly 
amend our tax filings. 
(R. 1541 at 84-86). No objection to this testimony was made by Plaintiffs' counsel. 
~ Indeed, Plaintiffs' counsel actually elicited further testimony about the advice of 
accountants from Sylvia. (R. 1542 at 66). Plaintiffs cannot now take advantage of 
this supposed error when it was their counsel who helped elicit the purportedly 
objectionable testimony. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1202, 1220 (Utah 1993) 
(discussing invited error doctrine). 
Plaintiffs contend that a continuing objection preserves their argument 
with respect to Paragraph 33. However, a review of the record demonstrates that 
the continuing objection was not intended to cover all supposed hearsay 
statements in the course of the seven-day trial, but rather was limited to matters 
~ having to do with the allegedly hearsay statements of Ellen, a third-party not 
present at trial. (See R. 1538 at 135-136, 139-140). Thus, Plaintiffs did not 
properly preserve their objection to the testimony now claimed to be hearsay, 
and this Court should decline to consider it on appeal. 
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In addition and alternatively, the findings in Paragraph 33 are not based 
on hearsay because the statements by Sylvia regarding the advice of the 
company's accountants were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. It is 
fundamental that hearsay is· defined as a statement that "a party offers in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Utah R. Evid. 801(c)(2). The 
testimony about the advice of accountants was not presented to prove that what 
the accountants stated to Sylvia was true, but rather that it was said and that 
Sylvia acted on the statement in electing not to file amended Company tax 
returns listing Lavinia as a shareholder. This evidence therefore falls outside of 
the hearsay rule, and there was no error in the trial court ad1nitting it and using 
it to support its Findings of Fact. 
D. Paragraph 47 of the Findings of Fact is Not Based on Improperly 
Admitted Hearsay.· 
Paragraph 47 of the trial court's findings states: 
On July 17, 2013, Lavinia entered into a Stock Interest 
Redemption Agreement pursuant to which the 
Company agreed to redeem her 20,000 shares for 
$138,000. 
App'x A at 9. Plaintiffs objected to the admission of the Stock Interest 
Redemption Agreement (Ex. D19), but the trial court admitted it holding that it 
was a business record. (R. 1539 at 111-116). Like the other documents discussed 
herein, proper foundation was laid for the admission of this document as a 
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business record by Cuong, the Company's president. (R. 1539 at 104-108). Also, 
like the other documents discussed herein, even if the Redemption Agreement 
itself was admitted in error, the admission would be harmless because there was 
ample non-hearsay evidence to support the finding. Namely, there was 
unobjected to testimony from Cuong and Sylvia regarding the stock transaction 
~ that is separate and appart form the allegedly hearsay agreement. (R. 1539 at 
104-106; R. 1541 at 36-41). The admission of the Redemption Agreement, even if 
erroneous (which it was not), was also harmless because the fact that Lavinia 
owned 20,000 shares in the Company was established by ample evidence. See 
Section I(B). 
In sum, all of Plaintiffs' arguments regarding the trial court's Findings of 
Fact being based on hearsay are unavailing, the trial court did not commit error, 
and the trial court's challenged findings should be affirmed. 
III. DEFENDANTS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO MAKE LAVINIA HA A 
PARTY TO THE CASE BEFORE INTRODUCING EVIDENCE ABOUT 
HER SHARES IN THE COMP ANY. 
In its ruling, and based on evidence submitted by Defendants, the trial 
court found that Lavinia contributed money to the market, was to initially 
receive 35,700 shares, but gave 15,700 of those shares to Weiman, leaving her 
with 20,000 shares. The trial court also found that on July 17, 2013, Lavinia 
entered into a Stock Interest Redemption Agreement pursuant to which the 
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Company agreed to redeem her 20,000 shares for $138,000. (Findings of Fact, 
App'x A, at ,r,r 9, 16, 47.) 
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court should be reversed because Defendants 
should not have been able to introduce evidence about Lavinia's shares in the 
Company and the agreement by which the Company purchased those shares 
because she was not a party to the case. Plaintiffs cite Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 14, which states: 11 At any time after commencement of the action a 
defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be 
served on a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all 
or part of the Plaintiff's claim against him." They argue that Defendants were 
required to join Lavinia as a party before any evidence could have been admitted 
regarding L~vinia' s interest in Southeast Supermarket. (Br. at 39). 
This argument fails. As a threshold matter, the rule is permissive. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 14 (setting forth when a party "may" join a third-party). It does 
not require that a third-party be added to the case before evidence about that 
party can be offered to the court. 23 
23 Compulsory joinder is addressed in Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. But Plaintiffs did not cite or analyze that rule anywhere in their brief, 
and have therefore waived any error allegedly relating thereto. See Pixton v. State 
Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("Generally, 
where an appellant fails to brief an issue on appeal, the point is waived."). Even 
if they had timely raised the issue, however, it would not require reversal. The 
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Moreover, Rule 14 relates solely to the addition of a· party that might be 
liable on the Plaintiffs' claims. The rule does not apply in a case, such as this, 
that does not assert liability and seeks only equitable relief-namely, the calling 
of a shareholders' meeting. (See Verified Complaint, R. 7-11.) 
As noted by Plaintiffs, a third-party claim may be asserted under Rule 
-vJ 14(a) only when the third party's liability is in some way dependent on the 
outcome of the main claim, or when the third-party is secondarily liable to 
defendant. Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 960 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). There is no imaginable scenario under which Lavinia (the third-party) 
would be liable to them if Plaintiffs were successful on their cause of action 
seeking a shareholders' meeting. Thus, a request to bring Lavinia in as a party 
would have been futile and wholly improper under Rule 14(a). 
Plaintiffs suggest that the Trangs had a fiduciary duty to Lavinia to protect 
Lavinia's interests in the corporation. See Br. at 40. They hypothesize that if there 
~ had been an adverse ruling against Defendants, any stock claimed by Lavinia 
could be negatively impacted, meaning that the Trangs could be liable to Lavinia. 
whole point of the doctrine is to ensure that the parties in the case are not 
unfairly exposed to conflicting or multiple liabilities due to the absence of the 
third party. But the absence of Lavinia in this case did not expose Plaintiffs to 
any such potential exposure. Nor do they claim it did. At the end of the day, 
Plaintiff simply disliked that they could not examine Lavinia directly regarding 
her shares. But if Plaintiffs felt such examination critical to their case they should 
have taken a trial preservation or attempted themselves to bring her to court. 
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Id. There are multiple problems with this argument. First, Plaintiff fails to 
articlulate exactly how an adverse ruling would harm Lavinia. Second, Plaintiffs 
fail to explain how they themselves have standing to assert the issue.24 And 
third, and most importantly, this is simply note a scenario which Rule 14(a) 
applies. As noted, Rule 14(a) is for circumstances where a defendant brings in 
someone who may have liability to them for the claims of the plaintiff. It does 
not apply where the defendant itself may be potentially liable to the third-party. 
See Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 768 P.2d at 960 n.8 (noting that 14(a) typically deals with 
situations involving indemnity, subrogation, contribution, express or implied 
warranty and the like, which are properly brought in a third-party complaint). 
Plaintiffs argument regarding the absence of Lavinia also fails because it 
was not timely asserted and has therefore been waived. Prior to trial, Plaintiffs 
not once suggested that Lavinia was a necessary party in the action, or should 
have been brought in as a party by Defendants. This is depite the fact that 
Defendants asserted throughout the proceedings that Lavinia was one of the 
original shareholders. See Defendants' Rule 26 Initial Disclosures, App'x C 
hereto {identifying Lavinia Ha as a person with information regarding 
24 Whether the Trangs could be held liable to Lavinia is no business at all. But 
even if one assumes for the sake of arcument that some fiduciary duty was_ owed, 
the Trangs exercised that duty by taking steps to ensure that Lavinia was 
compensated for her shares in the Company before any adverse decision 
potentially invalidating those shares had been made. 
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"[a]cquisition and ownership of shares of Southeast Supermarket").25 Had 
Plaintiffs believed it was a problem not having her in the case they should have 
and could have either moved to join her themselves, or moved to require 
Defendants to do so. They did not. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Plaintiffs have not cited any 
v£J authority for the proposition that a third-party must be brought in as a party to a 
case before evidence regarding the interests of that party may be introduced.26 In 
~ sum, the trial court properly considered the Stock Purchase and Redemption 
Agreement, as well as other evidence regarding Lavinia's shares in its Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment. The trial court did not err in 
concluding that Lavinia had to be a party before evidence of her interests could 
be received, and that decision should therefore be affirmed. 
25 Defendants also asserted Lavinia's ownership of the shares during the first 
mediation, which was held in July 2012. 
26 Indeed, no such authority exists. The issue in this case was what Plaintiffs held 
and what Coung held. The involvement of Lavinia as a shareholder, and the 
subsequent redemption of her shares, was relevant evidence in answer these 
questions. And there was no need to have her there as a party in order for such 
evidence to be submitted to the trial court. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT PLAINTIFFS' 
REQUEST FOR A SPECIAL SHAREHOLDERS MEETING WAS 
DEFICIENT; EVEN IF THAT DETERMINATION WAS IN ERROR, IT 
WAS HARMLESS BECAUSE THE COURT IN FACT ORDERED A 
SHAREHOLDERS' MEETING. 
Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred by determining that their April 
2011 letter did not constitute a proper demand for a shareholders' meeting. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 16-10a-702(1)(b), however, a proper demand 
for a special shareholders' meeting must be signed and dated by a shareholder or 
shareholders holding at least a 10 percent interest in the company, and must be 
delivered to the company's secretary. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-701(1)(b) 
( emphasis added). 
In its Findings of Fact, the trial court found that "[o]n April 11, 2011, 
counsel for Plaintiffs sent the Company, Attn: Cuong and Sylvia, a letter 
demanding that a special shareholders meeting be convened at the corporate 
offices of the Company no later than July 1, 2011 (the II April 2011 Demand")." In 
its Conclusions of Law, the trial court determined that the "April 2011 Demand 
did not comply with Utah law because it was signed and sent by Plaintiffs' 
counsel, and was not signed and dated by any of the shareholders in the 
company." (Conclusion of Law ,r 9, App'x A hereto.) 
Plaintiffs argue that the demand was proper even though it was signed by 
their attorney because of two principles of agency law: that "Utah courts have 
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long recognized that a client may be bound by the actions of their attorneys 
when the attorney is acting within the confines of their authority" and "the 
kn,owledge of an agent concerning the business which he is transacting for his 
principal is to be imputed to his principal." Br. of Appellant at 42. 
Defendants do not dispute that the case law cited by Plaintiffs stands for 
-J the propositions that Plaintiffs' attorney can bind them by his actions and that 
knowledge of the attorney's actions can likewise bind Plaintiffs. The Trangs do 
dispute the relevancy of this case law. The question here, however, is not 
whether Plaintiffs were in fact bound to go through with the meeting by virtue of 
their attorney's actions had Defendna ts elected to accept the demand, but rather 
whether the demand for a special shareholders' meeting met the detailed yet 
unambiguous requirements of the statute, which the trial court correctly 
concluded was not the case. The shareholder demand was not something that 
statutorily could be delegated to an attorney, and thus it was deficient and did 
....;) not need to be accepted by Defendants. 27 
Alternatively, even if the trial court somehow erred in concluding that 
Plaintiffs' demand was not proper due to failure to comply with the statute, such 
27 Defendants asserted the deficiency in the notice in June 2011 (R. at 70-99). 
Plaintiffs could have easily corrected the error by sending a new demand that 
was signed directly by Plaintiffs. They did not. 
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conclusion was harmless error given that the court determined that a 
shareholders' meeting should in fact be held. The court ordered: 
An annual meeting of the Company's shareholders shall 
be called by Defendants, and such meeting shall be held 
within the next seventy-five (75) days. The date, time, 
location, . and agenda for this meeting shall be 
established by Defendants, and the meeting shall be 
noticed by Sylvia, as the Company's secretary, in 
accordance with the requirements of Utah law. Votes at 
the meeting shall be taken in accordance with the 
shareholder percentages set forth in paragraph 1, above. 
(Order and Judgment ,r 3, App'x A hereto.) The Company held the meeting as 
ordered by the trial court on January 17, 2014 (though Plaintiffs declined to 
attend (R. at 1488). Thus, the trial court's conclusion that the 2011 Demand did 
not comply with the requirements of Utah statute did not impact the ultimate 
outcome of the proceedings on that question because the court ordered a meeting 
to be held, and a meeting was in fact held.28 In re A.M., 2009 UT App 118, ,r 21, 
208 P.3d 1058 ("Harmless error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that 
there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings." 
(quotations omitted)). The trial court's decision should therefore be upheld. 
28 Plaintiffs have alleged no harm as a result of the delay in the meeting. And 
any harm that could be alleged was caused by Plaintiff. See supra note 27. 
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V. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION TO 
AWARD COSTS FOR MEDIATION. 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in awarding $1,072.50 in 
mediation costs to Defendants because costs for mediation were not expressly 
authorized by statute. The trial court awarded these mediation costs after noting, 
however, that "Plaintiffs did not make any objection as to the mediation fees, and 
they therefore shall be awarded." (Mem. Decision Regarding Defendants' Mem. 
of Costs, and Plaintiffs' Mot. for Clarification and Stay at 3, R. 1519, attached 
...J hereto as App' x B). Because Plaintiffs did not object to Defendants' request for 
mediation fees in the trial court, they failed to preserve the issue and this Court 
should not consider it on appeal. Brady, 2013 UT App 97, ,r 38. 
Even if this Court decides to consider this issue, it should determine that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding mediation costs. Rule 
54( d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "costs shall be allowable as 
of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." The Utah 
Supreme Court "has taken the position that the trial court can exercise 
reasonable discretion in regard to the allowance of costs" while exercising a 
"duty to guard against any excesses or abuses in the taxing thereof." Hatanaka v. 
Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052, 1055 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Frampton v. Wilson, 605 
P.2d 771, 773-74 (Utah 1980)). 
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Although there is no statute specifically allowing a prevailing party to 
recover its mediation expenses as a recoverable cost under Rule 54(d), the trial 
court in this case correctly noted that it had discretion to allow the recovery of 
such costs. See Mem. Decision Regarding Defendants' Mem. of Costs, and 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Clarification and Stay ("Decision"), App' x B hereto, at 2. 
In its Decision, the trial court cited Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999 
UT App 80, 977 P.2d 508, which held: 
Defendant has failed to present any evidence 
persuading us that the trial court abused its discretion 
in awarding mediation expenses to plaintiff. At most, 
defendant argues that the court erred in awarding 
mediation expenses because such expenses are not 
statutorily authorized costs. This argument misses the 
mark. In many cases we have allowed the taxing of. 
costs despite the fact that no statute specifically 
authorized such costs (e.g. deposition costs). . . . 
Because defendant has not convinced us that the 
expenses incurred during mediation were unreasonable 
or were not 'necessarily incurred' ... we hold that the 
court did not exceed its permitted range of discretion in 
making such an award. 
Id. ,r 39. The Stevenett court reasoned that it is good public policy to "encourage 
exploitation of alternative dispute resolution methods by allowing the prevailing 
party to recover costs so incurred." Id. ,r 38 (citing cases outside Utah allowing 
awards of mediation costs); see also Long v. Stutesman, 2011 UT App 438, ,r 31,269 
P.3d 178 (declining to address a trial court's award of costs for mediation in light 
of inadequate briefing on why an award of costs for mediation was 
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inappropriate). If the Court determines to consider this issue, it should hold that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the mediation costs.29 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellees respectfully request that the 
trial court's decision be affirmed in all respects. 
DATED this 9th day of January, 2015. 
Nicole G. Farrel 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Appellees/Defendants 
29 Defendants asserted below that the mediation costs were appropriately 
awarded as a sanction for Plaintiffs' failure to participate in the court ordered 
mediation in good faith. (R. at 1434-1439). This provides an alternative basis for 
affirmance on appeal. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, if 20 ("[A]n appellate court 
may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground 
or theory apparent on the record."). 
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